Conceptualism, demonstrative colour concepts and the problem of illusory experience

Charlie Pelling, University of Reading (30 Jun 2005)

Mind2005 Graduate Conference, University of Edinburgh (30 Jun 2005-1 Jul 2005)

According to the conceptualist view in the philosophy of perception, we possess concepts for all the objects, properties, and relations which feature in our experiences. Richard Heck has argued that the phenomenon of illusory experience provides us with conclusive reasons to reject this view. In this paper, I examine Heck's argument, I explain why I think that Bill Brewer's conceptualist response to it is ineffective, and I then outline an alternative conceptualist response which I myself endorse.

Conceptualism has traditionally been thought vulnerable to an objection from 'fineness of grain': it has been thought that the colour shades (say) which feature in our experiences are more finely grained than our colour concepts. Conceptualists such as John McDowell and Bill Brewer try to answer this objection by claiming that in addition to general colour concepts, we can also possess demonstrative colour concepts that do match exactly the fineness of grain of the shades that feature in our experiences.

Richard Heck has argued, however, that this appeal to demonstrative concepts fails to solve the problems raised for conceptualism by the issue of fineness of grain, since it fails to explain how it is that illusory experiences, just as much as veridical experiences, represent objects as being very specific shades.

I argue that both Heck, in constructing his objection to conceptualism, and Brewer, in responding to it, miss a crucial distinction between demonstrative concepts of objects, on the one hand, and demonstrative concepts of properties, on the other.

I argue that though there may be good reasons to reject the view that I can acquire a demonstrative concept of 'that object' by having an experience which features 'that object', even if I am not in fact perceiving 'that object'; we should nevertheless accept the view that I can acquire a demonstrative concept of 'that property' by having an experience which features 'that property', even if I am not in fact perceiving anything which instantiates 'that property'.

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