visits to the SPPA website since 27 Apr 2005
Response-dependence entered the scene in the late 1980's as a generalisation of the idea of secondary qualities. Subsequently, the term has been used to cover very different ideas. The common ground is that response-dependent concepts are a priori connected with certain responses in certain observers in certain (substantially specifiable) conditions. But that is about as far as the agreement goes. There are surprisingly large variations both in the philosophical content given to the distinction between response-dependent and -independent concepts and in the formal apparatus employed to capture it.
The paper aims to provide an overview of the most influential versions of the distinction, and to distinguish three conceptual spaces that response-dependence theses may occupy. These correspond roughly, but only roughly, to the versions presented by Philip Pettit, Mark Johnston, and Crispin Wright. It is argued that the versions are best viewed not as competitors for a single role, but as different distinctions that can be combined to provide a more fine-grained picture of the areas under discussion.
To bring out the differences between the three versions, it is useful to view certain realism disputes as disputes about the location of the reference of the disputed concepts among candidates on several different levels. This framework enables us to distinguish the following:
1) Lightweight, Pettit-style response-dependence, according to which a concept is response-dependent if it comes to be possessed in a certain way. This version is neutral on the location issue and might apply even to natural kind concepts.
2) Strong a posteriori response-dependence, which locates the referent of the concept with a disposition to elicit the relevant response, e.g. because no suitable low-level, physical referent is found (roughly, but not quite, Johnston's version).
3) Strong a priori response-dependence, which is relevant when the essential role of the responses makes it appropriate to view the concept as criterially governed and conclude that its extension is determined on the level of sense rather than by a referent picked out by the responses (roughly Wright's version).
The levels framework provides a clear perspective on the intuitive content of three different (and complementary) brands of response-dependence. The outcome is a more fine-grained system of distinctions, which should facilitate a more detailed picture of realism-related issues in disputed areas such as colours, values, etc.
The task of giving a formal characterisation of the three versions of response-dependence remains. The paper concludes with a few remarks on the prospects and problems with this task.
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