visits to the SPPA website since 27 Apr 2005
John McDowell, in a series of influential papers, argues that an immodest theory of meaning, as proposed by Michael Dummett, according to which one must not only specify the meanings of linguistic items but also explain what such specifications consist in, is not feasible in principle. He argues that the restricted conceptual material that immodesty allows in terms of which the theory is to be constructed is incompatible with the very notion of content; and hence, such a theory cannot give an account of the description of language as an intentional activity of rational agents nor can it give an account of the normative dimension of meaning. In this paper, I defend a Dummettian immodest theory of meaning against McDowell's feasibility objection. I argue that McDowell's interpretation of the nature of the restricted conceptual material is incorrect: in particular, I argue that McDowell has misunderstood the dialectical interrelations between the various parts of an immodest theory of meaning. I propose the correct interpretation of Dummett's theory (with some modifications which I think is compatible with a Dummettian spirit) and show how it can account for the intentionality and rationality. In conclusion, I argue that one of the consequences of my argument is that McDowell's transcendental argument against Dummett's anti-realism fails.
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| visits to the SPPA website since 27 Apr 2005 |
