Human philosophy: Hume on natural instincts and belief formation

Treasa Campbell, University of Limerick (1 Jul 2005)

Mind2005 Graduate Conference, University of Edinburgh (30 Jun 2005-1 Jul 2005)

The term 'natural belief' was introduced into Hume studies by Kemp Smith and the term is now widely used in the literature on Hume to refer to a small group of principles that cannot be justified by reason yet are unavoidable features of how we operate in the world. This essay claims that the term 'natural belief' is a fundamental misrepresentation of the phenomena which it is attempting to characterize. I begin by providing an explanation of what it is that commentators mean when referring to 'natural belief' in Hume's work. In doing so I demonstrate how the term 'natural belief' fails to take cognizance of the radical change which Hume's work necessitates. I contend that the continued use of the term 'natural beliefs' masks the fundamental shift being called for and has enabled a situation to arise where phenomena, which Hume describes and wishes to be treated as instincts, are instead treated as beliefs. Hume calls for more then a mere reclassification of these phenomena as a unique form of belief what Hume demands is that these phenomena should no longer be viewed as any form of belief but as instincts inseparable from our species. What are regarded as 'natural beliefs', for example our affirmation in the existence of the external world, the existence of the self and of causation, are more accurately to be regarded as instincts. In continuing to regard such phenomena as beliefs one of Hume's greatest insights is lost for in arguing that these features of how we operate in the world are natural instincts rather then beliefs Hume highlights their universality, innateness and primacy. If philosophy is to have any relevance to us as human beings, it must take account of the cognitive capacities of our species. In characterizing these principles as natural instincts and not as beliefs, Hume has enacted a transformation in the epistemological landscape, one which has fundamental implications for our understanding of both reason and justification.

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