The aim of this paper is firstly, to present an Aristotelian metaphysical model which describes a complex, prima facie enigmatic, 'entity' hitherto unexplored. Secondarily, to present Aristotle's theory of secondary properties, which he develops using this metaphysical model. His theory is of interest to contemporary philosophy too, because he claims realism for the phenomenal properties of secondary properties. The 'entity' in question is one actuality, but two in being. I explore the metaphysical relations between the two beings and their material constitution; each of the two beings towards the other; the two beings and the thing that each of them belongs to. Aristotle uses the model to provide a realist account of phenomenal properties. I argue that for Aristotle, colours are what we would now call the phenomenal properties of colours, understood as the properties of objects that resemble our perceptual experiences of them. What red fully is, for Aristotle, is a property that belongs to the red object and it is such that it the way it appears to the perceiver and only while it appears to her. In a sense, we are a medium in which the appearance of the secondary qualities is realised, and in this way the potentialities of the object's nature come to be fully realised through their interaction with us.
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