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Consequentialism, Demandingness and Moral Obligation

Brian McElwee, University of St Andrews (10 Mar 2004)

First SPPA Seminar Day, University of Edinburgh

Perhaps the main objection to consequentialism is what has come to be known as the demandingness objection. In this paper I discuss how the consequentialist should respond to this objection, firstly by considering and rejecting two prima facie attractive responses, from Michael Slote and Bjorn Eriksson. In showing how these responses are unsatisfactory, I outline what I take to be the most plausible form of consequentialism, one which does not fall foul of the demandingness objection. This form of consequentialism denies the deeply unintuitive claim that we have a moral obligation to bring about the best consequences we can. The consequentialist must instead reject as fundamental the traditional deontological categories- 'right', 'wrong' and 'obligation'. Consequentialism should not be understood primarily as a theory of morality narrowly conceived as focusing on obligation, but instead as a theory of the goodness and choiceworthiness of actions and practices, and of what we have most reason to do.

Take the following claim:

Moral Consequentialism (MC): We have a moral obligation to bring about the best consequences we can. The right action is that which brings about the best consequences. All other actions are wrong.

Accepting MC leads to some deeply counter-intuitive results. For example, someone who gives up most of his time and money for the good of others, strives copiously to bring about large amounts of good, but does less than the very most he can, has, according to MC, failed in his obligations and is acting morally wrongly. This seems totally detached from our common sense moral thought.

I argue however that there are positions which are recognisably consequentialist, but which do not fall foul of this objection. Consider, for example, the following position:

General Consequentialism (GC): The best thing we can do is bring about the best consequences we can. What we have most reason to do is bring about the best consequences we can.

Now such a consequentialism has, as yet, made no demands whatsoever, and so does not, or at least not obviously, demand too much. I argue that consequentialists should defend GC, but reject MC.

A consequentialism which demands the best available consequences is counter-intuitive because of the conceptual link between moral demands and blameworthiness. In response to the demandingness objection, Michael Slote proposes a position which he calls 'satisficing consequentialism', which identifies right action or permissible action as that which brings about good enough consequences. In showing how Slote's account fails, I highlight the importance of taking account of the notions of effort, cost and sacrifice in considering whether we have met the demands of morality.

Given this importance, one might think it open to the consequentialist to work these notions directly in to an account of moral rightness and obligation, simply as a second set of relevant factors alongside consequences themselves. I argue that such a project is misconceived, by examining one such attempt by Bjorn Eriksson. I point out particular problems with Eriksson's account, before going on to emphasise structural problems which face any such account, and suggest that considerations relevant to objective choiceworthiness (i.e. consequences) must be kept firmly apart from those relevant to judging blameworthiness (e.g. effort, difficulty, cost, sacrifice). I conclude that the consequentialist seems committed to rejecting as fundamental the traditional deontological framework of right, wrong and obligation.

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