Is it possible to recreate the perception of one in another, that is can the perception of X be recreated within Y? Can I know what it is like to be you let alone a bat? If not, what epistemological consequences does that have? Should these consequences pose a problem or should they be welcomed with a modest nod as a natural consequence of the concept of self identity? This paper argues that what seems to remain mysterious regarding consciousness is not a result of the fact that it cannot be captured by the physicalist story, but that it is necessarily an outcome of a conception of self identity. To the extent that the property of identity is attributed to the self, consciousness will remain subjective, and not because it cannot be given an objective, scientific description but because it is unique to the outcome of whatever scientific mechanism of the self it is captured in. As such, if my conscious states cannot be perceived by another, in other words, even if my red is to remain a total mystery to your red, that should not darken the day when an objective account of consciousness will be given. This paper argues that it is the replication of a conscious state of one in another that is impossible since if such a phenomenon is attempted at, identity will be lost. However, that does not mean an objective account of consciousness cannot be given.
Consciousness is to be taken up as a dynamic state of organic nature, constantly shaped into different states due to experiences, thoughts, concepts and beliefs of the individual. The difficulty in and the attempt at trying to define consciousness by stripping it off of these factors is how the problem of consciousness seems to arise in the first place. This paper argues that all these factors may very well be present in the physicalist picture resulting in an objective account of consciousness but a unique one for each self. If the totality of a certain mechanism is the underlying descriptive account of consciousness, we might as well accept that just like every individual complex life form is different from one another, so is the conscious states attributed to them.